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Abstract
While being deployed in many critical applications as core
components, machine learning (ML) models are vulnera-
ble to various security and privacy attacks. One major pri-
vacy attack in this domain is membership inference, where
an adversary aims to determine whether a target data sam-
ple is part of the training set of a target ML model. So
far, most of the current membership inference attacks are
evaluated against ML models trained from scratch. How-
ever, real-world ML models are typically trained following
the transfer learning paradigm, where a model owner takes
a pretrained model learned from a different dataset, namely
teacher model, and trains her own student model by fine-
tuning the teacher model with her own data.
In this paper, we perform the first systematic evaluation
of membership inference attacks against transfer learning
models. We adopt the strategy of shadow model training
to derive the data for training our membership inference
classifier. Extensive experiments on four real-world image
datasets show that membership inference can achieve effec-
tive performance. For instance, on the CIFAR100 classifier
transferred from ResNet20 (pretrained with Caltech101), our
membership inference achieves 95% attack AUC. Moreover,
we show that membership inference is still effective when
the architecture of target model is unknown. Our results shed
light on the severity of membership risks stemming from ma-
chine learning models in practice.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) is powerful to provide automated
extraction of insights from data utilizing predictive models.
Thus, it has been deployed in a variety of critical applica-
tions ranging from autonomous systems [14, 31] to adver-
tising [34]. However, previous studies have shown that the
ML models are vulnerable to various privacy attacks, such
as adversarial example [3, 29], model inversion [7, 8], model
stealing [21, 30] and membership inference [4, 25, 27].
∗The first two authors made equal contributions.
In this paper, we focus on membership inference attack,
where the adversaries’ goal is to determine whether a spe-
cific data sample is used to train the ML models. Knowing
the membership status of individual user’s data may cause
severe information leakage. For example, knowing that a
certain patient’s clinical records were used to train a model
associated with a disease (e.g., to determine the appropriate
drug dosage or to discover the genetic basis of the disease)
can reveal that the patient carries the associated disease.
Previous studies [5,16,17,19,25,33] on membership infer-
ence mainly target on the models trained from scratch. How-
ever, training ML models following this paradigm requires
large amount of data and computational resources, which is
infeasible for individual researchers and small companies.
In practice, most of the ML models are trained following
the transfer learning paradigm. Transfer learning is an ef-
fective approach to transfer the “knowledge” learned from a
pretrained model (teacher model) to a new model (student
model) [32]. There are two approaches for transferring from
teacher model to student model. One is feature extractor
that freeze the first K layers of teacher model and train the
output layers of the student model. The other is fine-tuning
that use the parameters of teacher model as initialization and
fine-tune the model with student model’s datasets. Transfer
learning enables individual researchers and small companies
to effectively train an ML with good performance.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we take the first step to investigate the effec-
tiveness of membership inference against transfer learning.
Different from classical membership inference, there are two
attack surfaces in the transfer learning setting, membership
status of training data of both student model and teacher
model. Besides, the adversaries have access to either student
model or teacher model according to their capabilities. In
total, there are three different attacks in the transfer learning
setting.
Similar to previous membership inference attack, we as-
sume the adversaries only have black-box access to the stu-
dent model or teacher model, which is the most difficult sce-
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narios for the adversaries. We adopt the strategy of shadow
model training to generate the data for training the attack
models. In this paper, we seek to answer the following ques-
tions:
• Whether the three membership inference attacks is still
effective in the transfer learning setting?
• What is the impact of frozen layers on the effectiveness
of membership inference?
• Whether the membership inference is still effective
when the architecture of teacher model is unknown?
We systematically design the attack pipeline in the transfer
learning setting and conduct extensive experiments on mul-
tiple real-world datasets to answer the above questions. The
experimental results show that membership inference attacks
against teacher and student model are still effective with at-
tack AUC larger than 0.9. When the model is transferred
from teacher model to student model, the membership in-
formation of teacher model will not be leaked. Besides,
we observe that the performance of membership inference
in the student model significantly decrease when the num-
ber of frozen layers increase. Finally, we demonstrate that
the membership inference is still effective when the target
model and shadow model are trained by different model ar-
chitectures.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold:
• We take the first step to investigate the membership pri-
vacy against transfer learning.
• We systematically design a novel attack pipeline for
the three membership inference attacks in the transfer
learning setting.
• We conduct extensive experiments to illustrate the ef-
fectiveness of three different attacks. We also show the
impact of the number of frozen layers, and the effective-
ness of the attack when the architecture of the teacher
model is unknown.
2 Related Work
2.1 Membership Inference
Membership inference attacks have been extensively stud-
ied in many different data domains, ranging from biomedical
data [1,9] to mobility traces [24]. Shokri et al. [27] presented
the first membership inference attack against ML models.
The general idea is to use shadow models to mimic the tar-
get model’s behavior to generate training data for the attack
model. Salem et al. [25] gradually removed the assump-
tions of [27] by proposing three different attacks. Since then,
membership inference has been extensively investigated in
various ML models, such as federated learning [18], gener-
ative adversarial networks [4, 10], natural language process-
ing [28], and computer vision segmentation [12]. To mit-
igate the threat of membership inference, a number of de-
fense mechanisms have been proposed, which can be clas-
sified into three categories: reducing overfitting [15, 25, 27],
perturbing posteriors [13], and adversarial training [19].
However, all of the previous studies focus on the target
models training from scratch. This is the first work study-
ing membership inference in the practical transfer learning
setting.
2.2 Attacks against Transfer Learning
Previous studies have shown that transfer learning is vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks [32] and data poisoning at-
tacks [26]. Wang et al. [32] propose an adversarial attack
against transfer learning. The general idea is to optimize
an image to mimic the internal representation of the target
image, instead of optimizing the image to be predicted as
the target label as classical adversarial attacks [3]. Schus-
ter et al. [26] propose a data poisoning attack against word
embedding. Embedding based natural language processing
tasks follow the transfer learning paradigm, where the em-
bedding model and downstream model can be regarded as
teacher model and student model, respectively. The objective
is to either make the target word ranks higher among others,
or to move the target word closer/farther from a particular
set of words. The authors conduct extensive experiments
to show that the attack on the embedding model (teacher
model) can severely influence multiple downstream models
(student models).
These previous studies target at misleading transfer learn-
ing models’ behavior; while this paper targets at inferring
the private information of the training dataset of the transfer
learning models.
3 Background
In this section, we introduce some background knowledge
about transfer learning and membership inference attack.
3.1 Transfer Learning
To achieve higher performance, the deep learning models
have become more and more complex. However, training
these complex models from scratch requires large amount
of training data and computational resources. For exam-
ple, the OpenAI company spends almost 1.4 TB training
data and 4.6 million USD to train the GPT-3 model.1 Of-
tentimes, individual researchers and small companies cannot
1https://towardsdatascience.com/
gpt-3-primer-67bc2d821a00
2
Teacher Student
N Layers
Output
N-K
Layers
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer K
Layer N
…
Output
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer K
Layer N
…
Figure 1: Workflow of transfer learning. For the feature ex-
tractor approach, the student model is initialized by copying
the first K layers from teacher model, and updated for the last
N−K layers. For the fine-tuning approach, the student model
is updated for the whole layers.
afford such amount of resources. To address this issue, the
researchers propose the transfer learning paradigm. The gen-
eral idea is to let the leading companies collect large amount
of data from their users and pretrain the complex deep learn-
ing models with plenty of computational resources; then,
the pretrained models are published for downstream appli-
cations. Then, individual researchers and small companies
no longer need to train their complex deep learning mod-
els from scratch. Instead, they can use the pretrained model
as starting point and customize their own applications using
their local datasets.
Typically, in transfer learning, the pretrained model is re-
ferred to as teacher model, and the downstream model is re-
ferred to as student model.
3.1.1 Workflow of Transfer Learning.
The workflow of transfer learning is illustrated in Figure 1.
In practice, there are two kinds of transfer learning ap-
proaches:
• Feature Extractor. The student model freeze the first
K layers of teacher model, where K ≤ N− 1, and treat
them as a feature extractor. Then, the student model use
back propagation to update the parameters of the rest of
layers using their local datasets. This approach is suit-
able for the ML models with huge amount of layers and
parameters, such as GPT-3 with 175 billion parameters.
• Fine-tuning. Instead of freezing part of the layers
of the teacher model, the fine-tuning approach aims to
update the parameters of the whole ML model. Since
the parameters of the teacher model are well-trained,
the student model can converge fastly and achieve high
performance [6].
3.2 Membership Inference against ML Mod-
els
In machine learning, the objective of membership inference
is to determine whether a data sample was used to train the
machine learning models. Knowing the membership status
of individual user’s data may cause severe information leak-
age. For example, knowing that a certain patient’s clinical
records were used to train a model associated with a disease
(e.g., to determine the appropriate drug dosage or to discover
the genetic basis of the disease) can reveal that the patient
carries the associated disease.
Formally, membership inference attack can be defined as
the following function:
A : xtarget ,M ,K →{0,1}
Here, xtarget is a target data sample, M is the target model,
and K is the auxiliary knowledge of adversaries. The output
value equals 1 means that xtarget is a member of M ’s train-
ing dataset DTrain and 0 otherwise. The attack model A is
essentially a binary classifier.
4 Attack Methodologies
In this section, we first introduce the attack taxonomy and
threat model. Then, we depict the pipeline of our attacks.
4.1 Attack Taxonomy and Threat Model
Different from the classical membership inference, there are
two attack surfaces in the transfer learning setting: 1) de-
termine whether a data sample is used to train the teacher
model; 2) determine whether a data sample is used to train
the student model. Besides, based on the capabilities of dif-
ferent adversaries, they may have access to either teacher
model or student model. Considering two different attack
surfaces and two different adversary capabilities, there are in
total three types of attacks:
• Attack-1. The adversaries have access to the teacher
model and aims to infer the membership status of
teacher dataset. This type of attack is similar to the
classical membership inference attack where the target
model is trained from scratch.
• Attack-2. The adversaries have access to the stu-
dent model and aims to infer the membership status of
teacher dataset. In this attack, the target model is not
directly trained from the target dataset.
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• Attack-3. The adversaries have access to the student
model and aims to infer the membership status of stu-
dent dataset. Different from Attack-1, the target model
of this attack is transferred from the teacher model.
Notice that another combination that the adversaries have
access to the teacher model and aims to infer the membership
status of student model is infeasible, since the student model
is never used for training the teacher model.
Similar to previous membership inference attacks [25,27],
we assume the adversares have black-box access to either
the teacher model and student model. This means that the
adversaries can only query these models and obtain their
corresponding posteriors. Compared to the white-box set-
ting, where the adversaries have direct access to the archi-
tecture and parameters of the target model, the black-box
setting is more realistic, and more challenging for the ad-
versaries [20]. We further assume that the adversaries have a
shadow dataset which can be used to train a set of shadow
models to mimic the behavior of the target model. The
shadow models are then used to generate another dataset to
train the attack model. We will relax this assumption in the
evaluation part.
4.2 Attack Pipeline
The general attack pipeline is illustrated in Figure 2. Given
a data sample and the objective (determine membership sta-
tus of teacher dataset or student dataset), the adversaries first
query the corresponding target model (teacher model or stu-
dent model) and obtain the posterior. Then, the obtained pos-
terior is fed to the corresponding attack model for determin-
ing the membership status.
Attack Models Training. Given the attack pipeline, the
next question is how to train the three attack models. Recall
that the attack model is essentially a binary classifier that
takes as input the posteriors of the target model and deter-
mine the membership status of the target sample. We adopt
the strategy of shadow model training to derive the data for
training our attack classifier. For ease of presentation, we as-
sume that the adversaries have access to local datasets that
come from the same distribution of either teacher dataset or
student dataset. We will relax this assumption in the evalu-
ation part. The training processes of three attacks are illus-
trated in Figure 3.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we conduct empirical experiments on multi-
ple real-world datasets to illustrate the effectiveness of mem-
bership inference against transfer learning. Specifically, we
aim to answer the following key questions:
• Q1. Whether the three membership inference attacks
is still effective in the transfer learning setting?
• Q2. What is the impact of frozen layers on the effec-
tiveness of membership inference?
• Q3. Whether the membership inference is still ef-
fective when the architecture of teacher model is un-
known?
5.1 Experimental Setup
Environment. Our experiments are conducted on a server
with Intel Xeon E7-8867 v3 @ 2.50GHz and 2.5TB memory
and implement the attacks using Keras.
Datasets. In our evaluation, we use the following image
datasets.
• Caltech101. It contains 5,486 training images and
3,658 testing images, which split between 101 distinct
object categories (faces, watches, ants, pianos, etc.) and
a background category. Specially, there are about 40 to
800 images in each category and most of the categories
have about 50 images.
• CIFAR100. It is a benchmark dataset widely used to
evaluate the image recognition algorithms. The dataset
is composed of color images equally classified into 100
classes such as food, people, insects, etc. For each class,
there are 500 training images and 100 testing images.
• Flowers102. This dataset consists of 102 flower cate-
gories, which are commonly occurring in UK. It con-
tains 6,149 training images and 1,020 testing images
spreading in 102 classes. Notice that the Flowers102
dataset is unbalanced.
• PubFig83. This dataset consists of 8,300 cropped fa-
cial images coming from 83 public facial images, each
contains 100 variants. The images in PubFig83 are
taken from the web and not collected in a controlled
environment.
Metrics. In our experiments, we use four metrics, accu-
racy, precision, recall and AUC, to measure the attack per-
formance. In particular, AUC is a widely used metric to mea-
sure the performance of binary classification for a number of
thresholds [2, 8, 9, 13, 22–25, 35, 36]. Typically, higher AUC
value implies better ability to predict the membership status.
Experimental Settings. In our experiments, we use the
Caltech101 dataset to train the teacher model. The other
three datasets are used to train the student model.
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Figure 2: Overview of the attack pipeline. Given a target data sample, the adversaries first query the target model (teacher/student)
and obtain the corresponding posterior. The adversaries feed the posterior to the attack model to determine the membership status.
“In” and “Out” stand for member and non-member, respectively.
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Figure 3: Overview of the attack models training. The middle
left part and middle right part stand for the teacher shadow
model and student shadow model, respectively. The outputs of
these two shadow models are the posteriors used to train the
attack models. Notice that the two shadow models are slightly
different in the last few layers, since their prediction tasks are
different.
For each dataset D , we evenly split it into two dis-
joint parts, the target dataset Dtarget and the shadow dataset
Dshadow. We further split Dshadow into shadow training
dataset Dtrainshadow and shadow testing dataset D
test
shadow. The
Dtrainshadow and D
test
shadow datasets are used to generate the
ground-truth member and non-member data for training the
attack model. The same procedure applies to the target
dataset Dtarget , resulting in Dtraintarget and Dtesttarget . The target
datasets are used to evaluate the attack performance.
By default, we set the number of training epoch to 50,
the number of shadow models to 1, and the learning rate to
Table 1: Attack performance of Attack-1. The teacher model is
trained on Caltech101 dataset.
Dataset AUC Accuracy Precision Recall
Caltech101 0.906 0.753 0.644 0.882
Table 2: Attack performance of Attack-2. The target models
are first pretrained on Caltech101 dataset and fine-tuned on
three different datasets.
Dataset AUC Accuracy Precision Recall
CIFAR100 0.522 0.502 0.478 0.523
Flowers102 0.528 0.496 0.432 0.505
PubFig83 0.495 0.481 0.396 0.524
0.001. We use ResNet20 [11] as the target model.
5.2 Q1: Effectiveness of Different Member-
ship Inference Attacks
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of three
membership inference attacks on three different student
datasets. We use the fine-tuning approach for transfer learn-
ing. Table 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the attack performance of the
three attacks, respectively.
Attack-1. To recap, the adversaries have access to the
teacher model, and aim to determine the membership status
of teacher dataset, which is similar to the classical member-
ship inference. In this experiment, we perform experiment
on Caltech101 dataset. Table 1 illustrates the attack perfor-
mance. The experimental results show that the adversaries
can achieve 0.753 accuracy, 0.644 precision, 0.882 recall,
and 0.906 AUC. This result is consistent with that of [25].
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Table 3: Attack performance of Attack-3. The target models
are first pretrained on Caltech101 dataset and fine-tuned on
three different datasets.
Dataset AUC Accuracy Precision Recall
CIFAR100 0.954 0.850 0.779 1.0
Flowers102 0.994 0.897 0.834 0.959
PubFig83 0.998 0.935 0.887 0.975
Attack-2. Recall that in this attack the adversaries only have
access to the student model and aim to determine the mem-
bership status of teacher dataset. We first train the teacher
model on Caltech101 dataset, and fine-tune the teacher
model on three student datasets (CIFAR100, Flowers102 and
PubFig83) to obtain the student models. We feed the teacher
dataset Caltech101 to the student model and obtain the train-
ing samples for the attack model. Table 2 illustrates the at-
tack performance on three student datasets. We observe that
the attack AUC and recall are close to 0.5, which is simi-
lar to random guessing. Comparing the attack performance
of Attack-1 and Attack-2, we reveal that the membership
information of the teacher dataset is disappeared when the
teacher models are fine-tuned by the student dataset. In an-
other word, the student model would not leak membership
information of the teacher dataset.
Attack-3. The objective of this attack is to determine the
membership status of student dataset when the adversaries
have access to the student model. Similar to Attack-2, we
first train the teacher model on Caltech101 dataset, and fine-
tune the teacher model on other three datasets to obtain the
student models. The main difference is that in this attack we
feed the student datasets to the student models to obtain the
training data for attack model. Table 3 summarizes the attack
performance on three student models. We observe that the
membership inference performs well on three student mod-
els, meaning the membership inference is still effective in
student models.
Summaries. Through extensive experiments, we draw the
following conclusions: 1) having access to the teacher model
can severely leak the membership information of teacher
dataset; 2) the student model would not leak membership
information of teacher dataset; 3) the student model could
inevitably leak membership information of student dataset.
5.3 Q2: Impact of Frozen Layers
As discussed in the background part, when the ML models
are complex, we always adopt the feature extractor approach
to train the student model, i.e., freeze parts of the layers of
teacher model and update the parameters of the last several
layers using student dataset. In this subsection, we want to
Table 4: Attack performance of transfer attack. The shadow
models and target models are trained on VGG16 and ResNet20,
respectively. Both of them are first pretrained on Caltech101
dataset and fine-tuned on three different datasets.
Shadow→Target Dataset AUC
VGG16→ResNet20
CIFAR100 0.947
Flowers102 0.964
PubFig83 0.977
know what is the impact of the number of frozen layers on
the attack performance.
Setup. Recall that we use ResNet20 in our experiment,
which consists of 5 blocks, each contains two convolutional
layers, one batch normalization layer and one max-pooling
layer. In this experiment we freeze blocks instead of freezing
each individual layer, as illustrated in Figure 5. We freeze
the continuous K blocks on the model from first layer to last
layer, and K is in the range of [1,5]. In this experiment, we
focus on Attack-3, and the experimental results are shown in
Figure 4.
Observations. The experimental results show that the at-
tack performance consistently drops when the number of
frozen layers increase. In the deep learning model, the higher
the layer, the more abstract the features. When we freeze the
higher layers, it is more difficult for the student model to
remember the student training data; thus the attack perfor-
mance is worse.
When the frozen layers increase from 4 to 5, the attack
performance drops significantly. The reason is that there are
no parameters to be updated and the student model is exactly
the same with the teacher model; thus, the student datsets
have no impact on the target models.
5.4 Q3: Effectiveness of Transfer Attack
So far, we assume the model architecture of shadow model
and target model are the same, e.g., both of them are
ResNet20. However, in practice, we only have black box
access to the teacher model or student model and could not
obtain the architecture of the target model easily. Thus, in
this subsection, we evaluate the attack performance when the
architecture of shadow model and target model are different.
In another word, we aim to investigate the transferability be-
tween shadow model and target model.
Setup. We use VGG16 and ResNet20 to build the shadow
model and target model, respectively. We conduct the experi-
ments on three dataset, i.e., CIFAR100, Flower102, and Pub-
Fig83. We use the fine-tuning approach for transfer learning
and focus on Attack-3. The experimental results are given in
Table 4.
6
1 2 3 4 5
Number of frozen blocks
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
AU
C
CIFAR100
FLOWER
PUBFIG
1 2 3 4 5
Number of frozen blocks
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
CIFAR100
FLOWER
PUBFIG
1 2 3 4 5
Number of frozen blocks
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr
ec
isi
on
CIFAR100
FLOWER
PUBFIG
1 2 3 4 5
Number of frozen blocks
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Re
ca
ll
CIFAR100
FLOWER
PUBFIG
Figure 4: Impact of the number of frozen blocks. The target model is pretrained on Caltech101 dataset and fine-tuned on three
datasets to obtain three student models. The x-axis represents the number of frozen blocks and the y-axis represents the four attack
performance metrics respectively. The legends stand for three student datasets.
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Figure 5: Illustration of “block” frozen. A block is defined as a set of consecutive layers separated by the max-pooling layers. Freezing
a block means fixing all the parameters of the layers within this block. This experiment focuses on freezing blocks from first layer to
last layer. The range of the number of frozen block is K ∈ [1,5]
Observations. We observe that the attack AUC of all
datasets are larger than 0.9, and only drops by at most 3%
compared to Attack-3 in Q1. The experimental results show
that the membership inference is still effective when the ar-
chitecture of the target models are unknown.
6 Conclusion
This paper performs the first systematic study of member-
ship inference attack against transfer learning models. We
have discovered two different attack surfaces in the transfer
learning setting with two adversarial capabilities, resulting in
three different attacks. We systematically design the attack
pipeline and empirically evaluate the attack performance of
the three attacks on four real-world datasets.
The experimental results show that membership inference
attacks against teacher and student model are both effective.
However, when the model is transferred from teacher model
to student model, the membership information of teacher
model will not be leaked. We further reveal that freezing
more layers during training the student model leads to worse
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attack performance. Finally, we show that the membership
inference attack is still effective when the architecture of the
target model is unknown to to the adversary. We believe that
our studies can lead to future works on designing transfer
learning in a privacy-preserving way.
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